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The importance of providing access to the cultural heritage1 is widely accepted.  
Digital technology has supplied powerful new tools to reproduce and disseminate 
works and at the same time has transformed the demands and expectations of end-
users.2  Nevertheless, there are several issues that cultural heritage institutions 
(“CHIs”) must resolve in order to maintain their role of preserving and disseminating 
cultural heritage in the digital age.  Although some of those issues are budgetary 
rather than legal,3 copyright is obviously a key consideration in the digital use of in-
copyright works by CHIs.  The largest copyright challenge for CHIs is the process 
of identification of right holders of copyright and clearance of rights, i.e. obtaining 
authorization or licenses for use of in-copyright works. 
Stakeholders do not agree how best to facilitate CHIs in their important cultural 
role.  Some advocate the establishment of legal exceptions whereas others favor 
licenses.  My starting assumption is that, given the impact of online use, licensing is 
a more appropriate and flexible tool than exceptions.  However, obtaining individual 
licenses for the use of in-copyright works held by CHIs is complicated, time-
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 1. The term “cultural heritage” does not have a clear definition.  When talking about “cultural 
heritage” here, I am simply referring to works contained in cultural heritage institutions such as libraries 
and museums. 
 2. Estelle Derclaye, Conclusion, in COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL HERITAGE; PRESERVATION AND 
ACCESS TO WORKS IN A DIGITAL WORLD 233, 233 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2010); Nadine Klass & Hajo 
Rupp, Europeana, Arrow and Orphan Works: Bringing Europe’s Cultural Heritage Online, in EU 
COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 946, 950 (Irini Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds., 2014).  
 3. Rep. on the Implementation of Comm’n Recommendation, EC, 2011/711/EU, 2013-2015, at 7 
(June 2016); MAURIZIO BORGHI & STAVROULA KARAPAPA, COPYRIGHT AND MASS DIGITIZATION 104 
(2013); Derclaye, supra note 2, at 233-34. 
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consuming, and costly, in particular for cross-border online use.4  Thus individual 
licensing is not a practical solution for CHIs except for the use of a few well-defined 
works.  Even collective licensing does not fully solve the licensing issue because no 
collective management organization (“CMO”) has mandates from all right holders 
in a given field.5  Hence, I propose that the solution is to be found through collective 
licenses with legislative support, such as the system of extended collective licenses 
(“ECL”).6 
In this essay I will start by giving a brief account of the main strands which 
constitute an extended collective license in the Nordic countries, where it was first 
developed.7  I will describe two examples where ECLs have been used to facilitate 
access to the cultural heritage, in Norway and Finland respectively.  I will also 
discuss the compatibility of the system with international norms, in particular the 
Berne Convention,8 and finish with some reflections on challenges and benefits of 
the system of ECLs in facilitating access to cultural heritage. 
I.     THE NORDIC SYSTEM OF EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSES 
An ECL is a license for a specific use of in-copyright works in a specified field, 
based on a freely negotiated agreement between a CMO and a user, and extended to 
right holders that are not members of the CMO, commonly termed “outsiders”.9  The  
legal effect of the extension is made possible by a provision in a copyright act.10  This 
 
 4. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Creative Content Online in the 
Single Market, at 23, COM (2007) 836 final (Jan. 3, 2008); Assessing the economic impacts of adapting 
certain limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights in the EU: Analysis of specific policy 
options, at 17 (May 2014), https://perma.cc/PLN4-QCQ3; Cross-border extended collective licensing:  A 
solution to online dissemination of Europe’s cultural heritage?, at 70 (August 2011); Thomas Dreier et 
al., Museen, Bibliotheken und Archive in der Europäischen Union; Plädoyer für die Schaffung des 
notwendigen urheberrechtlichen Freiraums, 2012  ZUM 273, 280; Lucie Guibault, Cultural Heritage 
Online? Settle It in the Country of Origin of the Work 2015, (3), JIPITEC, 173-91, 173. 
 5. Commission staff working document:  Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright 
rules, at 67-68, SWD (2016) 301 final (Sept. 14, 2016); Mihály Ficsor, Collective Rights Management 
from the Viewpoint of International Treaties, with Special Attention to the EU ‘Acquis’, in COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 66-67 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 3d edn. 2016) . 
 6. See Rán Tryggvadóttir, Copyright and cross-border online use of works by libraries in Europe: 
the case for extended collective licences 21-23, 199, 365-67 (2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, KULeuven) (on 
file with KULeuven). 
 7. Here the term “Nordic countries” refers to Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
 8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
Experience:  It’s a Hybrid but is it a VOLVO or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 472 (2010); Felix 
Trumpke, The Extended Collective License – A Matter of Exclusivity?, 81(3) NORDISKT IMMATERIELLT 
RÄTTSSKYDD 264, 273 (2012). 
 10. See, e.g., Guibault, supra note 4, at 176; Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Collective Management in the 
Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 283, 290 (Daniel 
Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010); Thomas Riis, Ole-Andreas Rognstad & Jens Hemmingsen Schovsbo, Collective 
Agreements for the Clearance of Copyrights:  The Case of Collective Management and Extended 
Collective Licenses, in USER GENERATED LAW:  RE-CONSTRUCTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN 
A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 55, 58 (Thomas Riis ed., 2016); Alain Strowel, The European “Extended 
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extension effect can only be made effective by legislation. 
The system is not a solution for all uses of in-copyright works, only for those uses 
which are otherwise difficult to facilitate.  The ECL system has proven useful in the 
Nordic countries in various areas, mainly for secondary uses of in-copyright works.  
Thus specific ECL provisions exist in all of the countries for broadcasting;11 for the 
retransmission of broadcasts;12 for the use of archived broadcasts by broadcasting 
stations;13 for institutional reproduction;14 for use by libraries (and in some cases by 
other heritage institutions);15 and for certain use of works by handicapped persons in 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway.16  Furthermore, in Denmark and Finland there are 
specific ECL provisions for certain uses of works of visual fine art which can be used 
for CHIs.17  In addition to the specific ECL provisions, general ECL provisions have 
been adopted in all the Nordic countries except Finland since 2008.18  General ECL 
provisions are not limited to specific types of works, users, or uses, but ECL 
agreements based on general ECL provisions have to be specific with regard to what 
they cover.  These general ECL provisions were introduced in part to respond to the 
needs of CHIs in the digital age.19 
Although the ECL system is commonly referred to as the “Nordic ECLs system,” 
there are considerable differences in the ECL provisions of the five Nordic 
countries.20  There are, however, three main elements of the Nordic ECLs which 
 
Collective Licensing” Model, 34, COLUMBIA J.L. & ARTS 665, 666 (2011); Rán Tryggvadóttir, Digital 
libraries, the Nordic system of extended collective licenses and cross-border use, 2014(5) CITIP 314, 315 
(2014). 
 11. Consolidated Act on Copyright 1144 § 30(1) (2014) (Den.) [hereinafter DCA]; Copyright Act 
404/1961 § 25(f) (1961) [hereinafter FCA] (amended 2010) (Fin.); Copyright Act 97 § 23(1) (1972) 
[hereinafter ICA] (amended 2006) (Ice.); Copyright Act (Consolidation) No. 2 § 30(1) (1961) [hereinafter 
NCA] (amended 1995) (Nor.); 2 ch. 26e § Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 
1960:729) [hereinafter SCA] (amended 2000) (Swed.). 
 12. § 35 DCA (Den.); § 25(h) FCA (Fin.); § 12(a) ICA (Ice.); § 34 NCA (Nor.); § 26f SCA 
(1960:729) (Swed.). 
 13. § 30(a) DCA (Den.); § 25(g) FCA (Fin.); § 23 ICA (Ice.); § 32 NCA (Nor.); § 42g SCA 
(1960:729) (Swed.). 
 14. The ECL provisions for institutional reproductions are split between educational institutions on 
the one hand and other institutions on the other, such as public authorities and institutions, private 
enterprises, and organizations other than those established for educational purposes, except in Iceland. 
Compare § 13-14 DCA (Den.), § 13-14 FCA (Fin.), § 13-14 NCA (Nor.), and §§ 13, 16 SCA (1960:729) 
(Swed.); with § 18 ICA (Ice.). 
 15. § 16(1),(4) DCA (Den.); § 16(d) FCA (Fin.); § 12 ICA (Ice.); § 16 NCA (Nor.); §§ 16-17 SCA 
(1960:729) (Swed.). 
 16. § 17(4) DCA (Den.); § 19 ICA (Ice.); § 17 NCA (Nor.). 
 17. This is in addition to the ECL provision for broadcasting in these countries, which also covers 
works of fine art. 
 18. § 50(2) DCA (Den.); § 26 ICA (Ice.); § 36(2) NCA (Nor.); § 26(h) SCA (1960:729) (Swed.). 
 19. Guibault, supra note 4, at 176; Martin Kyst, Aftalelicens - Quo Vadis?, 2009(1) NORDISKT 
IMMATERIELLT RÄTTSSKYDD 44, 47, 50 (2009); PETER SCHØNNING, OPHAVSRETSLOVEN MED 
KOMMENTARER 465-66 (Thomson Reuters 5th edn. 2011); Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 477. 
 20.     AXHAMN & GUIBAULT, CROSS-BORDER EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING:  A SOLUTION TO 
ONLINE DISSEMINATION OF EUROPE’S CULTURAL HERITAGE? 42 (2011); Riis, Rognstad & Schovsbo, 
supra note 10, at 59; Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses in Action, 2012(8) 
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC), 930, 930-31; Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Avtalelisens som 
nordisk løsningmodell – Noen refleksjoner, særlig knyttet til avtalelisensens legitimitet i utlandet, 2012 
NORDISKT IMMATERIELLT RÄTTSSKYDD 620, 621 (2012); Tryggvadóttir, supra note 10, at 316-17. 
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justify the joint grouping.  First, ECLs are based on negotiations between CMOs that 
are representative of “a substantial number of authors of a certain type of works 
which are used” in each respective country and the prospective user.21  Second, the 
application of the agreement is extended by a provision in copyright law to right 
holders not represented by the CMO.22  The field and scope of application for ECLs 
is determined by the individual ECL provision in the copyright acts, but it is the 
agreement that sets out the actual use enabled by the license.  The third element 
concerns measures to secure the rights of the outsiders of the CMOs who are bound 
by the agreement due to the ECL provision in law.  Those measures are:  first, that 
outsiders must be treated in the same way as members, which is particularly relevant 
with regard to remuneration; second, outsiders have the right to demand individual 
remuneration even under collective remuneration schemes; and third, in many cases, 
but not all, outsiders are given the possibility to opt-out of the license agreement. 
A. REPRESENTATIVE CMOS 
Central to the justification of the ECL system is that the relevant CMO is 
presumed to be a representative for the interest of the outsider as well as for its 
members.23  Hence eligibility requirements for CMOs to conduct negotiations on 
ECLs are of paramount interest.  These are laid out in specific provisions dealing 
with the common requirements of ECLs in the copyright act of each Nordic country.  
It then falls to the negotiating parties, i.e. the CMO and the user, to assess the 
representativeness of the CMO for licensing a specific use in a specific sector.  If 
there is a requirement for governmental authorization of the CMO, the relevant 
authority will examine whether the requirement is fulfilled.24 
The key eligibility requirement for a CMO is that it represents “a substantial 
number of authors of a certain type of works which are used” in the country 
concerned.25  The representativeness requirement always relates to a specific 
territory.26  The term “substantial number of authors” is understood first, to cover all 
relevant right holders, including derivative right holders, such as publishers;27 and 
 
 21. This is the wording of the English translation of § 50(1) DCA (Den.).   
 22. ANNA VUOPALA, EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING–A SOLUTION FOR FACILITATING 
LICENSING OF WORKS THROUGH EUROPEANA, INCLUDING ORPHANS? 9 (2013). 
 23. Guibault, supra note 4, at 177; Rydning, supra note 10, at 77; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 10, at 
317.  
 24. Opinion on the cross-border effect of licences granted for digitization and communication of 
out-of-commerce works by cultural heritage institutions under a regime of Extended Collective Licences 
(ECL), at 5, ALAI (Sept. 14, 2016). 
 25. See English translations of § 50(1) DCA (Den.); § 26(1) FCA (Fin.) (which uses the word 
“numerous” rather than “substantial” in the English translation); § 23 ICA (Ice.); § 38(a) NCA (Nor.); 
26(k) § SCA (1960:729) (Swed.). 
 26. Felix Trumpke, Exklusivität und Kollectivierung:  Das skandinavische Modell der Erweiterten 
Kollektiven Lizenz (Extended Collective Licensing) 661 (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, Max-Planck-Institute 
für Innovation und Wettbewerb). 
 27. Except in Norway where the CMOs are, however, also representative of other relevant right 
holders. See Rydning, supra note 10, at 74; Ot.prp. nr. 15, Om lov om endringer i 
straffegjennomføringsloven og straffeloven,  146-47 (2006-2007); Ot.prp. nr. 46, Om lov om endringer i 
åndsverkloven m.m., 55 (2004-2005).  
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second, to be substantial in regard to the specific type of works used in the country 
as a whole, rather than to mean a substantial number of right holders of works used 
by an individual licensee.  Furthermore, preparatory documents clarify that 
“substantial” does not mean a majority of right holders or works, but rather 
substantial representation of the works or rights most commonly used in the specific 
field.28  Securing representation of foreign right holders by a national CMO is 
normally done through reciprocity agreements with similar CMOs in other 
countries.29 
A non-explicit but important prerequisite for the representativeness requirement 
is that the relevant CMO has the mandate from its members to negotiate the uses of 
works that an ECL provision covers.30  There are, however, no provisions on the 
wording of such mandates.  Thus they take different forms.31  In the European Union 
(EU), the definition of a CMO encompasses both CMOs mandated by right holders 
directly as well as CMOs mandated by law.32  However, in the EU, a legislative 
mandate on its own is not sufficient for a collective agreement to be considered an 
arrangement concerning management of rights,33 which is an important 
consideration under EU legislation.34  Thus it is a crucial part of the ECL requirement 
of representativeness that it is based on direct mandates from right holders. 
Finally, a key requirement for representativeness is that the relevant CMO has the 
capacity to manage the rights of outsiders properly.  This is not only determined by 
the number of members of the CMO, but also on other factors (e.g., how well the 
CMO is run and whether it fulfils requirements of good management and 
governance, as well as its financial capacity to manage the relevant affairs).35 
 
 28. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 161. 
 29. Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright:  Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, 
in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 1, 9 (Daniel Gervais ed., 3rd edn. 
2016); Lucie Guibault & Stef van Gompel, Collective Management in the European Union, in 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 3 edn., 2016), at 
158; Robin Kerremans, Katleen Janssen & Peggy Valcke, Collective Solutions for Cultural Collections 
Online: Search and Select!, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. &  PRAC. 638, 641 (2011); Adriana Moscoso, Cross-
Border Issues in Collective Management, 34 COLUM. J.L. &  ARTS 651, 651-56 (2011); Riis, Rognstad, 
& Schovsbo, supra note 10, at 57; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 10, at 317.  
 30.  Proposition [Prop.] 2014:181 Regeringens proposition med förslag till ändring av 
upphovsrättslagen [government bill] (Swed.), at 11-12; Tarja Koskinen-Olsson & Vigdís Sigurðardóttir, 
Collective Management in the Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS (Daniel Gervais ed., 3rd ed. 2016), at 250; Guibault, supra note 4, at 179; Rognstad, 
supra note 20, at 622; Vuopala, supra note 22, at 13-14.  
 31. JUKKA LIEDES, MEMORANDUM ON THE EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENCE 7 (2015), available 
at https://perma.cc/3PA2-2NAN. 
 32. Council Directive 2014/26, art. 3(a), 2014 O.J. (L 84), 72 (EU) [hereinafter CMO Directive]; 
Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 29, at 143. 
 33. Case C-301/15, Marc Soulier, Sara Doke v. Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, 
Premier ministre, ECLI:EU:C:2016:878, para. 52; Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Marc Soulier, 
Sara Doke v. Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, Premier ministre, Case C-301/15, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:536, para. 57. 
 34.  Compare the exhaustive list of exceptions in Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 
167), 10 (EC), which states the Directive is without prejudice to arrangement of management of rights in 
the EU Member States.  See discussion in Tryggvadóttir, supra note 2, at 220-23. 
 35. § 26(1)-(2) FCA 404/1961 (Fin.).  See also, PETER SCHØNNING, OPHAVSRETSLOVEN MED 
TRYGGVADÓTTIR, FACILITATING AVAILABILITY:  EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSES, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 515 (2018) 
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B. THE EXTENSION EFFECT 
The fundamental defining feature of the ECL system, which differentiates ECLs 
from general collective licenses, is that the effect of an agreement between a CMO 
and a user is extended to outsiders.  This extension effect is, as mentioned above, 
achieved with a provision in a copyright act, an ECL provision,36 which makes a 
collective license valid for the user, such as a library or another type of CHIs, also in 
relation to right holders of the same type of works who are not CMO members.  In 
other words, the legislation is the basis for the extension possibility.37 
The field and scope of application of ECLs is determined by the individual ECL 
provision in the copyright acts.38  These provide the outer limits of the subject matter 
for ECL agreements.  Many ECL provisions have a wide scope for uses, but it is 
important to remember that they do not have an automatic effect.  They only come 
into force if an agreement is reached between a relevant CMO and a user and the 
actual scope of the license is determined in that agreement (i.e., what use, by whom, 
and for which works).39  In other words, the impact of the extension, which is 
provided by a legal provision, only comes into effect through conclusion of a contract 
(i.e., an ECL agreement).40    An ECL agreement cannot allow wider use or apply to 
works other than those specified by the ECL provision, but can, and mostly does, 
stipulate a narrower use and narrower scope of works41 or limit the categories of 
beneficiaries (users) or right holders to which it applies (e.g., only authors and not 
publishers).42  If the agreement allows use outside the delimitations in the ECL 
provision, it cannot apply for the use of works of outsiders.  The agreement in turn 
is dependent on the mandate that the CMO receives from its members (i.e., what 
capacity the CMO has to grant licenses with respect to the rights of its members that 
it administers).43 
 
KOMMENTARER 502-03 (6th ed. 2016); ALAI, supra note 26, at 3; Johan Axhamn & Lucie Guibault, 
Solving Europeana’s Mass-Digitization Issues through Extended Collective Licensing?, 6 NORDIC 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 509, 516 (2011); Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 148-50; Vappu Verronen, 
Extended Collective Licence in Finland:  A Legal Instrument for Balancing the Rights of the Author with 
the Interests of the User, 49 J. Copright Soc'y U.S.A, 1143, 1148 (2001-2002). 
 36. § 42a (SCA 1960:729) (Swed.); § 50(3) DCA 1144 (Den.); § 36(1) NCA 30/06/1995 (Nor.); § 
26(1) FCA 404/1961 (Fin.); § 26.a ICA 73 (Ice.).  
 37. Jan Rosén, ‘Copyright Contracts — EU Solutions or National Concern? A Swedish Proposal 
to Amend the Copyright Act on Individual and Collective Contracts, in NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
INTERSECTION OF IPR AND COMPETITION LAW:  FROM MAGLITE TO PIRATE BAY 155, 169 (Hans Henrik 
Lidgard ed., 2011). 
 38. Rognstad, supra note 22, at 276; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 2, at 163-65. 
 39. Licenskonstruktioner og fotokopiering, delbetænkning, Betænkning nr 912, (Stougaard Jensen, 
København ed., 1981) at  40; Rydning, supra note 10, at 20, 73; Trumpke, supra note 26, at 327; 
Tryggvadóttir, supra note 12, at 317. 
 40. Ysolde Gendreau, What’s in a Name? Extended Collective Licences in Canada, in LIBER 
AMICORUM JAN ROSÉN 269, 283 (Gunnar Karnell ed., 2016).  
 41. Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 33; Rydning, supra note 10, at 16, 17, 50. 
 42. Kyst, supra note 19, at 48; Trumpke, supra note 26, at 461, 463. 
 43. J.A.L. STERLING, STERLING ON WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 629-20 (Trevor Cook ed., 4th edn. 
2015);  Guibault, supra note 4, at 179; Tarja Koskinen-Olsson & Nicholas Lowe, Educational Material 
on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights; Module 1: General Aspects of Collective 
Management, 2012 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 28; Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright 
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C. SAFEGUARD MEASURES FOR OUTSIDERS 
An indispensable requirement in any ECL agreement is that outsiders should be 
treated in the same way as members under the agreement.  This is especially relevant 
to remuneration and the distribution of the remuneration.  The other main safeguard 
measure is the opt-out possibility for outsiders.44 
Outsiders are guaranteed the same remuneration as members.  Remuneration for 
uses of works under an ECL agreement is decided in the agreement.45  As with all 
collective agreements, an ECL agreement is most often based on blanket licensing, 
which means a uniform pricing structure for all works.46  Because of the increased 
negotiating power of the CMO,47 it is generally agreed that the remuneration received 
under an ECL agreement is beneficial for outsiders, as they would normally not be 
able to negotiate a better deal on their own.48  The distribution of remuneration to 
right holders, both members of the CMO in question and outsiders, is decided by the 
CMO.49  The fact that CMOs take the responsibility for ensuring remuneration to 
outsiders is one of the main benefits of ECLs for users.50  It has been ascertained that 
in the Nordic countries the CMOs are diligent in identifying and locating outsiders 
in order to remunerate them.51  However, certain practices with regard to distribution 
of remuneration are not beneficial for outsiders, in particular for foreign outsiders, 
such as distribution of unclaimed remuneration to members only, no pay-out of 
remuneration below a certain minimum, and deductions for collective purposes.52 
 
and Neighbouring Rights in Canada:  An International Perspective, 1 CAN. J.L. TECH. 21, 27-28 (2001).  
 44. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 181-98. 
 45. It is possible that negotiating parties will come to an agreement that there is no remuneration 
due for certain uses under an ECL agreement, as there is no stipulation obliging the parties to negotiate 
remuneration. Cf. Trumpke, supra note 26, at 327 n.1246. There is at least one agreement under the Danish 
General ECL provision that stipulates free use.  Cf. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 175. 
 46. Riis, Rognstad & Schovsbo, supra note 10, at 63. 
 47. Johan Axhamn, Exceptions, Limitations and Collective Management of Rights as Vehicles for 
Access to Information, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE:  21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 164, 178 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2013); 
Christian Handke, ‘Collective Administration,’ in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT:  A 
GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 179, 180-81 (Richard Watt ed., 2014);  Koskinen-Olsson, supra 
note 10, at 291; Silke von Lewinski, Collectivism and Its Role in the Frame of Individual Contracts, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVENESS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 117, 124 (Jan Rosén ed., 2012); 
Schønning, supra note 35, at 495; Jens Schovsbo, The Necessity to Collectivize Copyright – and the 
Dangers Thereof,  in INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVENESS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166, 177 
(Jan Rosén ed., 2012); Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 51; Terese Foged, Danish Licences for 
Europe, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 15, 17 (2015); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS 
DIGITIZATION 82, 103 (2015); Verronen, supra note 35, at 1148. 
 48. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 196. 
 49. § 51(1) DCA 1144 (Den.); § 26(4) FCA 404/1961 (Fin.); § 37(1) NCA 30/06/1994 (Nor.); § 3a 
ch. 42a (SCA 1960:729) (Swed.).  See also CMO Directive art. 13. 
 50. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 10, at 320. 
 51. COPYRIGHT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, SOU 2010:24, AVTALAD UPPHOVSRÄTT: 
DELBETÄNKANDE AF UPPHOVSRÄTTSUTREDNINGEN 217, 229 (2010) (Swed.), available 
at https://perma.cc/8FZP-VKWQ;  Liedes, supra note 31, at 14; Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 
35; Rosén, supra note 37, at 175; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 187; VUOPALA, supra note 22, at 34. 
 52. Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 45, 55; Jonathan Band & Brandon Butler, Some 
Cautionary Tales About Collective Licensing, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV., 687, 698 (2013); Riis and 
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Another issue for outsiders concerning remuneration is the fact that under Nordic 
ECLs, compensation for use is often distributed collectively.  In such instances 
outsiders have the right to individual remuneration.  This is important, as rules 
regarding distribution of remuneration cannot be influenced by outsiders53 and are 
hence not always in their best interests.54  However, there are no guidelines as to how 
such individual payments should be calculated and the onus is on the outsider to 
prove the actual use.  If users do not provide statistics for the works used it can indeed 
be very difficult to demonstrate the use of individual works.55  Hence the right to 
individual remuneration may be more theoretical than real, especially for foreign 
outsiders residing abroad.  This being said, there is an increasing number of technical 
solutions available to solve the issue of identifying and registering online uses of 
works used under an ECL agreement.56  Such solutions will make the administration 
of individual remuneration practically feasible. 
The “opt-out” possibility in the Nordic ECL system gives a right holder who is 
not a member of the CMO the possibility to ban the use of his or her work under an 
ECL license.  Many but not all Nordic ECL provisions contain a mandatory opt-out 
possibility.57  It is worth noting that an ECL agreement can contain an opt-out 
possibility even when it is not mandatory in the ECL provision of the relevant 
copyright act.58  Such an opt-out provision in the actual ECL agreement can be 
applicable to all authors or right holders, both members of the CMO and outsiders,59 
as is the case in the Bokhylla (Bookshelf) ECL agreement, discussed below. 
D. TWO NORDIC PROJECTS FOR ONLINE ACCESS TO THE CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 
There are two Nordic projects I would like to mention that provide for online 
access to cultural heritage and are based on ECL agreements.  These are the 
Norwegian Bokhylla Project,60  which gives access to all books published in Norway 
before the year 200161, and the Finnish National Gallery Project62 which gives access 
 
Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 490-92; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 196. 
 53. SOU 2010:24, 225 (Swed.).  
 54. Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 491-492. 
 55. Rydning, supra note 10, at 79. 
 56. Sterling, supra note 43, at 629-30. 
 57. Koskinen-Olsson, supra note 10, at 292-94; Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 276; Trumpke, 
supra note 9, at 279-80; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, 188. 
 58. Ot.prp.nr.15 (1994-1995), Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m.m, at 29 (Nor.), Tillæg A 
Folketingstidende 1984-1985, Bind II, Lovforslag nr. L 113, at 1994  (Den.); Prop. 69 L (2014-2015), 
Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak): Endringer i åndsverkloven (gjennomføring av EUs 
hitteverkdirektiv og innføring av generell avtalelisens mv.), at  23 (Nor.). 
 59. Schønning, supra note 21, at 468; Trumpke, supra note 26, at 264-65, 306. 
 60. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF NORWAY, CONTRACT REGARDING THE DIGITAL DISSEMINATION OF 
BOOKS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF NORWAY AND KOPINOR [hereinafter Bokhylla agreement], 
available at https://perma.cc/UN8A-DD8K.   
 61.  According to information from Kopinor, the CMO for reproduction rights in Norway, in 
September 2016, 211,454 book titles were available in the Bookhylla project. 
 62.  Rán Tryggvadóttir, Balancing of interests and cross-border use: Room for Nordic co-
operation?, 6 NORDISKT IMMATERIELLT RÄTTSSKYDD 652, 662 (2015); Koskinen-Olsson & 
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to visual artwork by Finnish artists.63  Although both are based on extended 
collective licenses, they differ in many ways, which reflects the flexibility inherent 
in the ECL system. 
Both agreements allow for opt-outs, but the Norwegian project allows both CMO 
members and outsiders to opt out whereas the Finnish allows only outsiders to opt-
out.  Fewer than two percent of the number of works made available under the 
Norwegian Bokhylla agreement have been opted-out64, and none from the Finnish 
National Gallery Project.65  Remuneration under the Norwegian project is based on 
per page per year,66 whereas in the Finnish project the CMOs receive a lump sum67 
from which the CMOs distribute a certain amount to the relevant right holders.  
Finally, the Norwegian project is only accessible to users with a Norwegian IP 
number68, whereas the Finnish project provides for worldwide access.69 
These projects are examples of successful endeavors to enable online access to 
cultural heritage.  The ECL system is widely accepted in all the Nordic countries and 
has functioned well since its introduction.70  Thus the question has been posed of 
whether the system could be used elsewhere, in particular for digital use of works.71  
 
Sigurðardóttir, supra note 30 at 260-61; Press release, Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (Nov. 
20, 2014). 
 63.  The agreement covers the works of around 930 Finnish artists, amounting in March 2015 to 
just over 37,000 works of which around 33,500 of which were accessible on the Internet. 
 64.  Information from Kopinor in September 2016; see also SWD, supra note 5, at 75. 
 65.  E-mail from Tommi Nilson, Executive Director, Kuvasto (one of the two CMOs that 
negotiated the ECL agreement) to author (Oct. 5, 2016) (on file with author). 
 66.  Bokhylla agreement, supra note 60, at Art. 8-10.  From 2015 and onwards it is NOK 0.33 
(about USD $0.04) index linked. 
 67.  Around $2.1 million (USD). 
 68.  The Norwegian National Library may upon request give other users access, i.e. those without 
Norwegian IP numbers, for specific purposes, such as research and education; cf. Bokhylla agreement, 
supra note 60, at Art. 4.  As of September 2016, fifty five individuals without a Norwegian IP number had 
had access to the service, cf. information from Kopinor, Oct. 31, 2016. 
 69. See further description of these two projects in Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 167-68, 170-71. 
 70.  Ds 2003:35, Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället - genomförande av direktiv 2001/29/EG, 
m.m.,  277; Riis and Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 496-97; Rognstad, supra note 20, at 621; Tryggvadóttir, 
supra note 10, at 316; Dinusha Mendis and Victoria Stobo, Extended Collective Licensing in the UK - 
One Year On: A Review of the Law and a Look Ahead to the Future, 4 EURO. INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 
208, 208 (2014). 
 71. Kerremans, Janssen & Valcke, supra note 29, at 647-48; Pamela Samuelson, Legislative 
Alternatives to the Google Book Settlement, 4 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 697, 709 (2011); Allard Ringnalda, 
Orphan Works, Mass Rights Clearance, and Online Libraries:  The Flaws of the Draft Orphan Works 
Directive and Extended Collective Licensing as a Solution, 1 MEDIEN UND RECHT INT'L 3-11 (2011); Stef 
van Gompel and P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Orphan Works Problem:  The Copyright Conundrum of 
Digitizing Large-Scale Audiovisual Archives, and How to Solve It, 1 POPULAR COMMUNICATION - THE 
INT'L J. OF MEDIA & CULTURE 61, 65 (2010); Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing 
Content:  How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 6 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INDUS. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC) 669, 687 (2007); Gervais, supra note 43, at 38-45, 89; Daniel Gervais, 
Collective Mangement of Copyright:  Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, in COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 1, 21 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2nd edn. 2010) ; IAN 
HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY; A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 37-38 
(May 2011); Jia  Wang, Should China Adopt an Extended Licensing System to Facilitate Collective 
Copyright Administration:  Preliminary Thoughts, 6 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW 283-
89 (2010); Silke von Lewinski, Certain Legal Problems Related to the Making Available of Literary and 
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This has led to various attempts to adopt an ECL system as described below. 
II. ECLS OUTSIDE OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
Within Europe, the UK adopted an ECL system in 2014.72  The Secretary of the 
State was given the power to authorize a licensing body to grant ECLs without 
limitations on which works, uses or to which beneficiaries an ECL scheme can 
apply.73  Nevertheless, each authorization must specify to which types of works and 
to what uses the authorization applies.74  Furthermore, any license under an 
authorization must be non-exclusive75 and include an opt-out possibility.76  Thus the 
UK ECL provision is similar to the general ECL provisions in the Nordic countries.77  
The first application for an authorization to operate an ECL scheme was announced 
in December 2017.78  This hesitant start may partly be due to the complexity of the 
system, which CHIs think will hinder its use for any large scale digitization.79  In 
particular, the requirements that CMO must fulfil to be authorized to manage an ECL 
scheme, especially with regard to representativeness and informed consent of 
members, seem to be more onerous than in the Nordic countries.80 
Other European countries have introduced legislation based on collective 
management with legislative support to enable large-scale digitization and cross-
border accessibility of out-of-commerce works, notably Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic.81  The Netherlands82 and the Czech Republic have 
proposed ECL schemes for out-of-commerce works.83  Most importantly, in 
December 2016 the EU Commission proposed the introduction of an ECL solution 
with cross-border effect for the use of out-of-commerce works by cultural heritage 
institutions.84  At the end of October 2017 a compromise proposal was tabled in the 
 
Artistic Works and other Protected Subject Matter through Digital Networks, UNESCO E-COPYRIGHT 
BULLETIN 15 (2005); Jane Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-paid, 3 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
1383, 1438 (2014). 
 72. Cf. Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations (SI 
2014/2588) (Sep. 11, 2014), based on the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, cf. Clause 77(3) 
of the Act with the inclusion of Section 116B into the Copyright and Designs Patents Act (“CDPA”). 
 73. United States Copyright Office, supra note 47, at 89. 
 74. CDPA, supra note 74, at § 116B(2); CRPR, supra note 72, at Art. 4(2). 
 75. CDPA, supra note 74, at § 116B(4); CRPR, supra note 72, at Art. 17(1) 
 76. CDPA, supra note 74, at § 116B(3); CRPR, supra note 72, at Art. 4(4)(d). 
 77. Prop. 69 L, Proposisjon, supra note 58, at 15; Riis, Rognstad & Schovsbo, supra note 10 at 70. 
 78. See the notice for open consultation on the application, available at https://perma.cc/48SC-
VSBV. 
 79. European Commission, supra note 3, at 39; Pamela Samuelson, Comment Letter on Notice of 
Inquiry regarding Mass Digitization 10 (6 Oct. 2015). 
 80. Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 238-45. 
 81. European Commission, supra note 3, at 37-41. 
 82. Riis, Rognstad & Schovsbo, supra note 10, at 70. 
 83. European Commission, supra note 5, at 37-41.  The introduction of ECLs in Switzerland has 
also been discussed, cf. Willi Egloff, Extended Collective Licenses - ein Modell auch für die Schweiz?, 11 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR IMMATERIALGÜTER-, INFORMATIONS- UND WETTBEWERBSRECHT 671-86 (2014). 
 84. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on copyright in the Digital Single Market, (Sept. 14, 2016), Art. 7-9. For an account of the proposed 
solution, see Rán Tryggvadóttir, The European Union’s proposed measures to improve licensing practices 
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EU Council that contained an additional provision on ECLs, expressly allowing 
national ECL agreements if they fulfill the three-step test85 for uses limited to 
national territories.86  However, it remains to be seen when and whether the Digital 
Single Market proposal will be adopted and which provisions and wording the final 
version will contain. 
The ECL system has been under consideration in several countries outside 
Europe.87  However, in Canada, Australia and the USA such considerations have not 
led to the adoption of an ECL system.  A positive study on the implementation of 
ECLs in Canada88 was ignored in favor of exceptions in 2012.89  In Australia a form 
of ECLs for libraries for mass digitization purposes and use of orphan works was 
considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in 2013.90  
Nevertheless, in the final report, the ALCR did not recommend the adoption of 
ECLs.91  The ALRC concluded that the adoption of a fair use clause, a limitation on 
remedies for use of orphan works and the expansion of the preservation clause for 
cultural institutions would address the needs of CHIs and provide an adequate 
framework for mass digitization.92  These recommendations have, however, not yet 
been incorporated into the Australian Copyright Act.93  The US Copyright Office 
(USCO) proposed in 2015 the introduction of a limited pilot ECL scheme for mass 
digitization purposes.94  The proposal was in many ways similar to the UK ECL 
scheme although the USCO proposed that the ECL solution should, unlike the UK 
scheme, be limited to certain works, i.e. published literary works, embedded images 
and photographs.  Furthermore, it was proposed that the use under an ECL agreement 
 
and ensure wider access to content in cultural heritage institutions and their compatibility with the Nordic 
ECL system,  NIR 6/2017, 615-628. 
 85. The three-step test is found in several international legal instruments:  Berne Convention, supra 
note 8, at Art. 9(2); Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 15 April 
1994, Art. 13; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, Art. 10(1) [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, Art. 16(2); Infosoc Directive, Art. 5(5); Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print 
Disabled, June 27, 2013, Art. 11. 
 86. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the 
Digital Single Market - Consolidated Presidency compromise proposal, (30 Oct. 2017) 016/0280 (COD) 
13842/17, Art. 9a, pp. 45-47.  In the new provision it is stipulated that the cross-border effect of such 
national ECL agreements may be provided at later stage, cf. Art. 9a (5). 
 87. Daniel Gervais, Extended Collective Licensing:  A Significant Contribution to International 
Copyright Law and Policy, in LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSÉN 311, 318 (Gunnar Karnell ed., 2016); 
Gervais, Collective Mangement, supra note 43, at 21; Wang, supra note 71; Riis, Rognstad & Schovsbo, 
supra note 10, at 70. 
 88. Daniel Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing Regime in Canada:  
Principles and Issues Related to Implementation, Study Prepared for the Department of Canadian Heritage 
(June 2003). 
 89. Gendreau, supra note 40, at  278. 
 90. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy:  Discussion Paper 
229-34 (May 2013). 
 91. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy (ALRC Report 122) 
274 (November 2013). 
 92. Id. at 16, 275.  
 93. Cf. the Australian Copyright Act No. 63, 1968 as subsequently amended up to Act No. 4, 2016. 
 94. U.S. Copyright Office, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 7-8, 72-105 (2015). 
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would only be for non-commercial purposes and limited to online use to certain end-
users, i.e. not general online use.  Several public comments were received during the 
consultation from inside and outside the USA.95  However, the proposal was 
withdrawn in September 2017, mainly due to lack of interest by stakeholders.96  Thus 
is seems unlikely that the system will be adopted outside of Europe (at least not in 
these countries) in the near future. 
III. COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
There are legal challenges inherent in the ECL system which have raised 
questions as to the compatibility of the system with international legislation.  These 
concern the question of the legal nature of the extension effect, the question whether 
the opt-out possibility may be a prohibited formality under the Berne Convention 
and whether the system is compatible with the Convention’s principle of national 
treatment. 
A. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE ECL SYSTEM AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 
The legal nature of the extension effect making an ECL agreement binding for 
outsiders is the subject of some controversy.  Some commentators maintain that the 
extension is an exception or limitation on the outsider’s exclusive right97 and thus 
must fulfil international norms, such as the three-step test, whereas others claim that 
the ECL system is simply an arrangement of management of rights,98 and thus does 
not constitute an exception or limitation with regards to outsiders.99  One challenge 
for the discussion is that there is no clear definition in international treaties or 
elsewhere of the terms “exception” and “limitation,” such that there are varying 
interpretations and uses of the terms in different forums.100 
 
 95. Eighty three public comments were received from various organizations and individuals, 
available at https://perma.cc/3JFN-YRNM (last viewed Sept. 27, 2016). 
 96. U.S. Copyright Office, Mass Digitization Pilot Program, available at https://perma.cc/B7JA-
3HK6 (last viewed Mar. 29, 2017). 
 97. Jane Ginsburg, Berne-Forbidden Formalities and Mass Digitization,  B.U. L. REV., 745-75 
(2016); Trumpke, supra note 26, at 340-42; Jane Ginsburg, With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy: 
Berne-Compatibility of Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Title-Searching, BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 
1583-622 (2013); Rognstad, supra note 20, at 631 (2012); Trumpke, supra note 9; Strowel, supra note 
10, at 668; Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 48-9 (2011); Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Avtalelisenser, 
NORDISKT IMMATERIELLT RÄTTSSKYDD, 151-59 (2004). 
 98. See, e.g., VUOPALA, supra note 22, at 12-13; Foged, supra note 47, at 20; Schønning, supra 
note 21, at 495; Verronen, supra note 35, at 1159. 
 99. Cf. discussion in Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 200-10. 
 100.Axhamn, supra note 47, at 172; Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an international 
instrument on limitations and exceptions to copyright  19 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
https://perma.cc/4QHA-DFB4);  LUCIE GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS. AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 16 (2002); 
Trumpke, supra note 26, at 176, 426-27, 429; Martin Senftleben, WIPO Copyright Treaty, in THOMAS 
DREIER AND P. BERNDT HUGENHOLTZ, CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 123-24 (2016); Pierre 
Sirinelli, Exceptions and Limitations on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2 (Dec. 3, 1999); J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW, 434 (2003); Axhamn & 
Guibault, supra note 20, at 47 fn. 240; Annette Kur, Limitations and Exceptions Under the Three-Step-
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There are important differences between the system of ECLs and exceptions or 
limitations in the common understanding of the terms.  First, traditionally, exceptions 
are understood as uses authorized by legislation making permission from right 
holders unnecessary, and which usually affect all relevant right holders of works to 
which that the exception applies.  The ECL system, on the other hand, affects right 
holders differently depending on whether they are members of the relevant CMO or 
not.  For members, the ECL agreement is a “normal” CMO agreement.  The essential 
element of the ECL system is the voluntary membership of a substantial number of 
right holders of the relevant works.101  Outsiders, for whom uses under an ECL 
agreement could be considered as exceptions to their exclusive rights, are a specific 
group, varying in size depending on how representative the CMO is.102  Second, the 
ECL system is based on a two-tier system, i.e. the ECL provision and the actual ECL 
agreement.  The provisions set out the conditions and parameters for ECL 
agreements and enable their extension effect.  However, as explained above, it is the 
ECL agreement negotiated by a CMO on behalf of the relevant right holders which 
determines which uses are allowed,103 within the scope of the ECL provisions and 
their own mandates from right holders.  Third, although uses under exceptions are 
sometimes remunerated, the amount of remuneration is commonly decided by 
governmental authorities and not the stakeholders, whereas remuneration for uses 
under an ECL agreement is negotiated by the relevant CMO and the user.104 
The primary argument for seeing the extension effect of the ECL system as an 
exception or limitation that needs to fulfil international norms is the fact that the 
licensing of authors’ works by a CMO without the author mandating the CMO to 
license those works is a significant restriction on the author’s exclusive right.  
Practically speaking it resembles a legal license.  The inherent restriction, from the 
point of view of the outside author, is not ameliorated by the fact that it is only a 
restriction on non-members of a CMO.  In fact, it can be seen as aggravating the 
restriction despite the right to remuneration, for example, if the outsider is in 
principle against CMOs or if the outsider does not have the right to become a member 
and has no way to influence decisions.105  The inherent restriction is furthermore 
aggravated when there is not sufficient transparency with regard to concluded ECL 
agreements,106 which is especially difficult to guarantee with regard to foreign 
 
Test – How Much Room to Walk the Middle Ground?, in ANNETTE KUr, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM; PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 210 (2011); Annette 
Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water - How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the 
Three-Step Test?, RICH. J. OF GLOBAL L. & BUS., 287-350 (2008). 
 101. Jean-Paul Triaille et. al., Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Information Society 305, (Oct. 2013); Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 930; 
Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 30. 
 102. Trumpke, supra note 26, at 687. 
 103. Trumpke, supra note 9, at 278; Trumpke, supra note 26, at 334.  
 104. Schønning, supra note 21, at 462; Koskinen-Olsson, supra note 10, at 293; Axhamn & 
Guibault, supra note 20, at 51; U.S. Copyright Office, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 7-8, 72-105 
(2015); Foged, supra note 47, at 17. 
 105. For a discussion on the different categories of outsiders, see Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 
182-84. 
 106. Requirements for transparency have not been explicit in the Nordic ECL system.  Id. at 194-
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outsiders.  Lack of transparency makes it difficult for outsiders, especially foreign 
outsiders, to make use of the safeguard measures in the system, whether it is to opt-
out or to demand individual remuneration.  Furthermore, if a national ECL agreement 
covers both national and foreign rights, the number of outsiders can far outnumber 
the number of members of the relevant CMO as very few foreigners would be 
members of the national CMO unless residing in the country of the agreement.  Such 
foreign authors cannot influence the ECL agreements in the same way as members 
of the CMO negotiating the ECL agreement.  Thus, even if there are reciprocal 
agreements with foreign CMOs in force that actually give a mandate for ECLs, the 
number of foreign authors will always outnumber national members of the relevant 
CMO.  The representation of foreign authors and other right holders through 
reciprocal agreements is not always adequate and foreign outsiders are less likely 
than nationals to receive remuneration for use under an ECL agreement.107  Finally, 
although ECLs facilitate uses that are in the public interest, such as in order to 
encourage the communication and distribution of information, such uses have 
traditionally not be seen as fundamental rights of users comparable to users’ right to 
freedom of expression.108  Thus it could be argued that restrictions on the exclusive 
right of authors in such areas should be carefully scrutinized, and at least as well as 
exceptions based on fundamental rights.  One way to secure such scrutiny of 
restrictions is to check their compatibility with international norms, in particular with 
the three-step test. 
Nordic ECL provisions applicable for CHIs give room for potentially wide online 
use of in-copyright works in CHIs.  It is unlikely that unlimited online use for all 
works would be agreed upon by CMOs representing right holders.  Nevertheless, in 
my view there needs to be a safety check to ensure that the system is not employed 
for too wide a use of outsider’s works.  Thus, I am of the opinion that the binding 
effect of an ECL agreement on outsiders should be regarded as a limitation or 
exception to the outsiders’ exclusive rights that must fulfill international norms for 
the above-mentioned reasons.  However, as the above account shows, the ECL 
system is of a hybrid character; an intricate mixture of freely negotiated agreements 
and exceptions.  Therefore, I additionally maintain that the ECL system can also be 
seen as a system of rights management but only for uses that fulfill international 
norms.  Whether international norms are deemed to be fulfilled will depend on 
individual ECL agreements as well as on how the safeguard aspects of the system 
are applied in relation to the areas of use.  The area of use is therefore of importance 
as is the interplay of elements such as the opt-out possibility, transparency 
requirements and the method of remuneration.  In my view, Nordic ECLs, assessed 
 
95. 
 107. Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 9, at 490-92; Axhamn & Guibault, supra note 20, at 45, 55; Band 
& Butler, supra note 52, at 698; Tryggvadóttir, supra note 6, at 211-12. 
 108. See discussion in Guibault, supra note 4, at 105-07 on the influence of the justification on the 
limitation’s nature.  However, in the digital environment this classification of justifications may have 
shifted with the public policy objective to disseminate information emerging as the central justification 
for copyright limitations, cf. MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP-
TEST 30-32 (2004) . 
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on the basis of the actual agreements, generally fulfil international norms.  First, they 
are for clearly defined uses in freely negotiated agreements; second, they apply for 
uses that are difficult to facilitate otherwise; third, uses are remunerated.109  Hence 
in the majority of cases the Nordic ECL system could be considered a rights 
management system. In this way, the ECL system can be reconciled with the 
dichotomy between exception and management of rights.110  The recently proposed 
ECL provision in the EU compromise proposal seems to support this hybrid 
approach.111 
B. OTHER INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND THE ECL SYSTEM 
The Berne Convention is based on the principle of national treatment.112  In theory 
the national treatment principle is respected in all ECL provisions,113 although this 
may not be the practice in all instances.  In particular, certain practices with regard 
to remuneration of foreign right holders might not be in conformity with the 
principle, as mentioned above.  Nevertheless, it has been concluded that as the aim 
of the system is not to exclude foreigners, the objections can be overridden based on 
the fact that the practices are in place for practical reasons.114 
The question has been raised of whether the opt-out possibility in the ECL system 
could be a formality incompatible with the Berne Convention.115  However, the 
conclusion of most scholars is that the opt-out possibility is compatible as it relates 
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IV. CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS 
 
The ECL system provides for a solution which addresses the need to make in-
copyright works available in a way that affords flexibility and legal certainty to users, 
such as CHIs, and is at the same time not unacceptably intrusive on the exclusive 
right of the outside right holder.  This balance is achieved through the negotiation of 
the ECL agreement between the stakeholders.  The right holders’ interests, both 
members’ and outsiders’, should be adequately protected by the relevant CMO, given 
the stronger negotiating power of CMOs compared to the individual right holders 
and assuming adequate representativeness by the CMO. Thus, the ECL system 
constitutes a pragmatic solution based on a hybrid theoretical model where the 
extension effect, although constituting an exception on the outsiders right, can be 
seen as an arrangement of management of rights based on legal presumption of 
mandate, depending on the area of use under an ECL agreement and the deployment 
of safeguard measures. 
Nevertheless, the ECL system is not the answer for all uses of in-copyright works 
and as the above account shows it may not be a solution that fits all countries.  This 
may be due to some of the challenges inherent in the ECL system as well as in 
varying internal legal and cultural structures.117 
The main challenge is whether there are relevant CMOs that are representative for 
the works and uses that the system is supposed to facilitate.118  This is less of a 
problem within Europe where there is a long tradition of collective management of 
certain rights, but it might be a problem in other jurisdictions.  However, there may 
also be a chicken and egg issue here as the adoption of ECL systems for access to 
works in CHIs might well encourage the establishment of CMOs for that purpose.119  
A related challenge is the structure of CMOs which must be sufficiently transparent 
and capable of safeguarding the interests of right holders, members and outsiders 
alike. 
Another challenge is the fact that as ECLs are based on freely negotiated 
agreements, and if an agreement is not reached, the particular use may not be 
facilitated.  The likelihood of reaching an ECL agreement often depends on issues 
relating to the remuneration and the ability of stakeholders to reach a mutually agreed 
conclusion.  However, that is not a challenge limited to the ECL system but to all 
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types of licensing. 
A third important challenge relates to uses in cross-border situations as is the case 
with use on the Internet because of the territoriality of copyright.  If there is no ECL 
system in the receiving countries, use of outsiders’ work in such countries may be 
deemed infringement of their copyright.  However, if ECL agreements that fulfill 
international norms are seen as arrangements of management of rights, this may 
imply that in infringement cases in countries other than the country of origin of the 
ECL agreement, the applicable laws might be judged as the laws of the contract 
which would thus make cross-border online uses possible if the CMO had the 
mandate to negotiate uses of its members for the relevant territories.120  This is, 
however, not legally certain and would in my view only be possible with regard to 
ECL agreements that provide for the cross-border online use of national works, i.e. 
works that had a certain connection with the country where the ECL agreement was 
negotiated.121 
These challenges represent important issues that have to be considered when 
adopting a solution based on an ECL system to provide access to cultural heritage.  
However, in my view they do not diminish the benefits of the ECL system for mass 
uses of in-copyright works where individual licensing would be impracticable.  The 
benefits are first and foremost the flexibility of the system and the fact that uses under 
ECLs are mainly based on freely negotiated agreements.  ECLs can enable uses of 
works that would otherwise not be legally possible.  Thus the system can provide for 
enhanced legal access for end-users to cultural heritage, and remuneration which 
authors and other right holders might otherwise not receive.  In my view the system 
of ECLs is an important tool for facilitating transactions and lawful availability of 
works of authorship in mass use situations such as for access to cultural heritage. 
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